I analyze strategic appointments from a hybrid theoretical perspective that combines noncooperative game theory with Markov chains. The games highlight the multistage, multi-actor, agendasetting features in the politics of appointments. The chainsderived from a Markov model in which the game is embedded in the form of a transition matrix-provide a dynamic characterization of system-level behavior with a micro-analytic foundation. The main finding is two distinct classes of states (strategic situations) that are collectively but not individually absorbing and that are substantively distinct from one another. I relate these two regimes to the literature on presidential appointments in an attempt to reframe the conventional questions in a way that might provide a foundation for a new line of empirical inquiry.
Still other examples span levels of government. U.S. state governments are regularly called upon to redistrict. From a strategic perspective, their corresponding gerrymandering shares the aforementioned features. For instance, a partisan entity in the state may redraw district lines, subject to judicial approval, in an attempt to change the identity and preferences of the pivotal voter of the national legislature.
Finally, multistage, multi-actor behavior targeted toward changing end-game group composition may occur exclusively within a political institution. For instance, at the commencement of a new Congress, internal organizational decisions are made regarding committee assignments, in which previous-Congress seat-holders have a de facto entitlement to keep their seats should they so request. The sequence leading up to altering committee composition consists of within-party leadership choice, withinmajority-party Speaker nomination, subject to House approval, bilateral bargaining between party leaders over committee sizes and party proportions, within-party compilation of slate of nominees to committee slots, and finally, House approval (or rejection) of the proposed slates. And, yet, all of this hotly contested and highly competitive behavior is not directly about policy but rather about marginal changes (filling vacancies) in the membership of collective choice bodies (standing committees) that are policy initiators nested within the legislative branch. This paper attempts to reduce these complexities to their essentials. It, too, is a multistage process. I first construct and analyze a one-period (single period) formal model with early-stage agenda setting in which the object of choice is a last-stage player-not a policy-and in which the proposed player is subject to middle-stage approval prior to becoming a member of a last-stage voting body with a vacancy.
The second step is to extend the simple core model to a multistage version.
1 Finally, the multistage game with optimizing behavior is embedded in a Markov process.
Of the many possible substantive applications of the model, the most widely analyzed is executive appointments either to the judicial branch or to regulatory 1 Multi = 2.
agencies that employ voting as their primary collective choice mechanism. The relevant literature is voluminous, however, the number of works presenting formal models of these processes is small. Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast (1989) present an appointments model that combines the presidential and congressional stages, allows a single agent to dictate the policy, and then grants the president and Congress a veto. The model of Snyder and Weingast (2000) is similar. Hammond and Hill (1993) frame the issue as "deference or preference," by which they mean:
is the empirical regularity of Senate acceptance of presidential nominees evidence of the Senate indiscriminately deferring to the president's judgment, or is regular Senate passage due to the president anticipating opposition and offering compromise nominees? Based on examples using win sets in a two-dimensional space, they make a case for the latter, preference interpretation. Similarly, Chang (2001) In summary, while there are reference points and similarities between the literature and the aims of this paper, the present focus on strategic appointments in a repeated game where the ultimate decision maker is a collective choice body appears to be unique. As we will see, the methodological approach taken here also departs from the literature and potentially significant ways.
A one-period game
The following assumptions characterize policies, players, preferences and payoffs.
The policy space Y is composed of three discrete points on the real line: left, center, and right. For ease of computation these are normalized, so
More often than not I refer to policies in terms of their positional mnemonics rather than their coordinates. Clearly, this assumption is simple. For the final phase of the analysis, having a discrete policy space is essential, however.
The players include a proposer P , a confirmer C , and a two or three-person agency A. Every player i has an integral ideal point x i ∈ Y and a distance based utility function defined over outcomes in Y as follows:
Moves are shown on the extensive form in figure 1. The proposer nominates an agent a who has a known preference type in {L, C, R}. The confirmer, whose ideal point is fixed at C = 0, accepts or rejects the nomination. The agency sets the policy y via majority rule (whether or not the most recent nominee was accepted).
[ Figure 1 ]
A key concept in the analysis is a state. but the potential significance of the status quo is often realized in this model, too.
For cases of agency size equal to 3, the last-stage choice process is well-defined: the policy will be that most-preferred by the median agent. In the event that the nominee is rejected by the confirmer, however, the choice of the two-person agency is less well defined. Some researchers have postulated in similar circumstances that the outcome will be the midpoint of the median interval. This assumption is questionable, however, when there is an exogenous status quo that lies outside the interval bounded by the two agents' ideal points. I assume that the agency choice function is:
In other words, for a fully populated agency, the outcome corresponds with its median voter' s ideal point; for an agency with a vacancy and two members with identi-cal ideal points, the outcome corresponds with those ideal points; for an agency with a vacancy and two members with different ideal points, the outcome corresponds with the ideal point of the member nearer the status quo, if once such member qualifies; otherwise, policy does not change.
Finally, I assume that if the proposer-confirmer stages fail to result in a filling of the vacancy, a penalty is assigned to the proposer and confirmer. Players' utility functions are then modified to:
The term g is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 in cases of gridlock, while the parameter γ is a penalty in [0,1]. The penalties can be different for the proposer and confirmer, but the agency is not penalized for its vacancies because it is not responsible for filling them.
The game is one of complete information and finite horizon. It has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. A formal statement of the equilibrium, however, is more than a little tedious, because of the large number of states that need to be considered. Specifically, there are two proposer types times three possible values of the status quo times three combinations of incumbent agents-36 in all. Although half of these are mirror images of the other half, that still leaves 18 cases to consider.
For our immediate purposes, it suffices to summarize the equilibrium in tabular form.
[ Table 1] For each of the 36 states, the optimal proposal strategy is sensitive to whether to confirmer has a credible threat to veto the nominee. If credibility is lacking, the proposer nominates an extremist or ideologue of his liking. Otherwise, she compromises with the nomination of a moderate. Compromises occur in three of the 18 states for each type of proposer, and gridlock never occurs in equilibrium. Though not a breakthrough in modeling, table 1 has a redeeming feature of completeness which proves to be a source of leverage for the more sophisticated analysis that follows.
A two-period model
Complete information, single-period models can be powerful and parsimonious tools for understanding a may political settings. However, in some instances, there are a priori reasons for suspecting that such models fail to capture an important aspects of strategic behavior. For instance, consider recent controversies surrounding delays in the Senate via a filibuster threats in judicial appointments. While some of the motivation for such resistance is undoubtedly preference-based, which the oneperiod model can accommodate well enough, another motivation is almost surely the beliefs (hopes?) on the part of minority Democrats and loyal opponents of the executive branch that in the near future, after a stroke of the electoral success (luck?), they will be majority Democrats and/or occupants of the executive branch. This is consistent with the observation that confirmation rates drop during presidential election years. 4 To the extent that the latter kinds of concerns match or dominate the more standard focus on conflict of interest-and by no means are the two incompatible-a model with a longer time horizon is required.
There is a catch, however. It is well-known that infinite-horizon game-theoretic models are cursed with the problem of multiple equilibria which have a strong tendency to impede or maim empirical analysis. Maimed empirical analysis is a net liability.
Another defense for considering alternatives to infinite-horizon approaches is empirical. Perhaps politicians do not live forever or occupy office in perpetuity, even though more than a few ultimately leave their offices feet first. Similarly, perhaps politicians are unwilling and/or unable to see very far into, and optimize with respect to, the future. Therefore, for reinforcing theoretical and empirical reasons, I take a small step into repetition and dynamics at first. I analyze a pair of plays of the one-period game with intervening actions by a nonstrategic player which, following convention, we will call Nature.
Nature introduces uncertainty into the appointment process in two ways. First, she may randomly induce early retirement on a member of the agency by, for example, infusing him with an insatiable desire to spend more time with his family.
While this interpretation is consistent with the most frequently articulated reason for early retirements within the beltway, cynic-skeptics of family time may prefer an alternative interpretation: Nature randomly kills agents. Either way-through guilt or grenade-regular opportunities for replacement appointments arise. So we assume that, between the two periods of play, Nature eliminates one and only one of any three-member agency. Following an instance of period-1 gridlock, in contrast, Nature takes a break from havoc-wreaking and the incumbent agency members live to regulate another day. Formally, define α as a mapping: α :
In the latter case, the three possible outcomes-{a 1 , a 2 , φ}, {a 1 , φ, a 3 } and {φ, a 2 , a 3 } are assumed to be equally likely and one such outcome happens with certainty.
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Second, Nature's reach extends to the proposer, too. For instance, she may gore the incumbent (or his intended successor) on grounds that the proposer failed to get the requisite votes to retain (accede to) office. For the time being, I simply 5 Alterations would be straightforward, but not particularly revealing as the model is presently constructed. For example, one could postulate that the probability of exit is positively correlated with age, blood cholesterol levels, being a member of the out party. . ., or negatively correlated with having a degree from the Kennedy School, owning a townhouse in Georgetown, or being named Greenspan, Simon, or Richardson.
postulate to existence of a parameter β, which is the probability that the proposer with ideal point R wins the next election. This can be interpreted in either of two ways: as an exogenously imposed assumption that conservatives have a probabilistic advantage in capturing the executive branch, or, perhaps less objectionably, as an incumbency advantage proportional to β > .5.
6 Regardless of interpretation, as β deviates from .5, asymmetry is introduced into the model.
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The introduction of at least two substantively motivated stochastic components ties the two otherwise-independent, one-period games together as shown on figure 2.
The first such game has six terminal nodes. When it is embedded in the two-period game, however, Nature moves prior to commencement of the second period. Her random acts have the potential to generate up to six different starting states for the second and final period of play: two possible proposers × as many as three different combinations of agents on the two-person agency. While this complicates matters somewhat, every endogenously generated starting condition component within every possible lottery that may start the second period is a state that has already been analyzed for the one-period game. All that remains, then, is to solve the first period game, albeit with lottery-defined payoffs. That is, instead of using the payoffs from the one-stage game, we use the probability-weighted payoffs from the set of lotteries defined by the actions of Nature.
[ Figure 2 ]
For the time being, the game is solved by backward induction for specific sets of parameters. 8 Again, with a 36 possible states, the quantity and diversity 6 There are some ripple effects in the latter interpretation, e.g., that R be interpreted as "what the executive wants" rather than right of center. Furthermore, one should then disregard any states beginning with L. I want to allow for regime changes but have not settled on the most transparent way to do so.
7 Analytically similar to the discussion in the footnote about α, another approach would be to make β a function of an endogenous component of the game. For instance, electoral accountability could be introduced by stipulating that β i is the probability that the incumbent gets reelected, and that β i |y = C > β i |y = L or R.
8 I have experimented on a moderately large range of parameter values but not of equilibrium behavior is overwhelming. Rather than dwell on the variation, I
highlight the importance of the findings in terms of prior research and then turn to a thorough discussion of an example that reveals some key structural and behavioral intuition implicit in all the states.
A feature shared by the two-stage and one-stage games is that both ideological and compromising proposal strategies can be rationalized as equilibria, depending upon the starting conditions. This serves to illustrate further that some of the literature on presidential appointments portrays, and attempts futilely to reconcile, a false dichotomy. If and when a president appoints an ideologue, approval of such an appointee by the Congress is not necessarily evidence of congressional deference to the president. Likewise, if and when a president appoints a moderate, such an appointment is not necessarily evidence of congressional dominance over the president. Within this framework, all such outcomes reflect differences or in the states or conditions-not differences in strategic or institutional capacities of the participants in the conflict.
A unique feature of the two-stage game relative to its one-stage counterpart is that gridlock over appointments can occur. Figure 3 is an illustration. The shaded cells represent the equilibrium path. (The cells for the R proposer can be interpreted as payoffs for the out party or disregarded; they are inconsequential in terms of the solution of the game for this state.) The state is diagrammed spatially on the left side of the figure and shows that this is a case of head-to-head conflict between the proposer and to confirmer: each player has current representation on the agency, and the proposer has an opportunity to solidify his representation by appointing a type L agent who will make the left-most position unambiguously pivotal.
[ Figure 3 ]
From the confirmer's perspective, the game is more one of defense than offense. Specifically, situations such as these may be ones in which forgoing some sufficiently systematically to report on robustness tests.
immediately obtainable benefits can lead to greater benefits in the future. This is indeed the case in the example. Solving the scenario by backward induction dictates that we begin on the right. The six rows of three payoffs on the far right are probability-weighted payoffs for the multiple possible games that may be played in the second period, given that any one of the first through sixth terminal nodes were reached during the first period. The data from which those payoffs are derived are presented in the white, bracketed cells, which represent node-specific lotteries over second-period (sub)games. This construction makes identification of the subgame perfect equilibrium fairly straightforward.
For any given choice in period 1 that the proposer could make-L, C, or Rthe confirmer has the authority to instate the new agent or to leave the vacancy untouched. Her decision will determine whether the next and final period is a lottery over as many as six games (in the case of confirmation, on top of each pair of bracketed data) or two games (in the case thus defeating the nomination).
Focusing on the center of the three total expected payoffs given on the far right of the figure, we can easily specify the confirmer's optimal strategy for each of the three proposer contingencies. Going from bottom to top, if the proposer were to nominate and R-type, the confirmer would accept it, because his total payoffs from the game would be 3.80 rather than 2.25.
9 If the proposer were to choose C in the first period, the answer is the same, because the consequences of adding C to the agency and adding R to the agency are agency-median-identical. This is not the case, however, if the proposer nominates L. In this case, an outcome of L will surely occur in period 1. The confirmer does not like that, on one hand, but, on the other hand, it is simply a continuation of the status quo, which is the same outcome that would be reached should the confirmer choose to defeat the nomination. In other words, defeating L has no net disadvantage in first-period payoffs other than the gridlock penalty, γ C , assumed here to be .1.
Therefore, the strategically decisive question is whether the expected secondperiod payoffs to the confirmer can compensate for the gridlock penalty and make it worthwhile to oppose the proposal. This is the point at which the choice over lotteries is crucial. If the confirmer accepts L in the first-period, the second-period lottery is such that with probability 2/3 outcome L will result, and with probability 1/3 outcome C will result. In contrast, the odds for the confirmer's most preferred outcome C under the gridlock scenario are 50-50. In the expected total payoffs, then, (that is, the sum of first-period certain payoffs plus the discounted secondperiod expected payoffs), obstruction is the preferred strategy for the confirmer, yielding 2.25 as opposed to 2.20.
As we turn the proposer, the optimal course of action is quite clear. He optimizes subject to the knowledge, just ascertained, of what the confirmer will do in each of the three possible contingencies. Proposing L gives the proposer an expected total payoff of 3.25. Proposing C yields 1.90. Proposing R yields 1.90 (and, in all likelihood, ire of his constituents). So, the proposer opts for L even though he knows it will not pass muster with the confirmer, and the confirmer engages in "extended debate" while L Appointee withers on the vine.
The example is a useful one, because the implied empirical scenario is not uncommon, it illustrates the logic of decision-making in the game, and it shows how this game is capable of explaining phenomena that one-period games cannot.
An important problem remains, however. With 36 states, how can we know which are most important and why?
A repeated game
Although the two-period version of the model has some advantages over its predecessors, such as the ability to account for gridlock and a greater capacity for future contingencies to condition present decision-making, it is limited in other respects. Its coverage of an exhaustive set of states, while an advancement over approaches that simply generate tailored-to-order examples, is also a curse. How useful is it to have a theory that accommodates a large number of situations, if the range of behavior that is rationalizable within the situations is so large that nearly everything is consistent with the model? Needed is a way of either measuring empirically the common states in specific settings, or of extending the theory so that it winnows down the number of states. Although tackling the empirical chore is not unimaginable, I continue on the theoretical track.
Markov models have been used widely in the natural sciences to help understand stochastic processes. A handful of social science applications exist as well, however, the normal approach seems to be of a reduced form variety. In the application below, I exploit the game-theoretic model developed above to ascertain what the transition probabilities are, thereby providing a micro-analytic foundation for an otherwise reduced-form approach.
The Markov extension also depends fundamentally on states. One issue that can be addressed is whether, given the assumptions about behavior and outcomes within the system, most or all states are reached. The flip side of this coin is whether there is a single, absorbing state, or, barring that, whether a small and substantively intelligible number of states attract and contain motion from within the system. The final concern is the speed with which an unconstrained that entertains the prospect that all states are viable settles down and behaves more predictably.
Embedding more or less conventional Nash equilibrium analysis in a Markov process is easy in principle but somewhat more difficult in practice. Although there is uncertainty involved regarding how Nature's actions will determine exactly what subgame is played in the second period, players behave rationally subject to their information. Once the game is embedded in a Markov process, however, it is important to realize that players do not see or optimize beyond the pairs of stages of the game. The Markov transition matrix figuratively puts a boundary on the rationality of the players exactly commensurate with the embedded game.
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The technique consists of forming a 36 × 36 transition matrix whose states are exhaustive of those defined by the nested appointments model. Let the transition matrix be denoted P . A given component p ij represents the probability of being at state j at period t + 2 (at the end of the two-stage game), given that players were at state i at period t. Therefore, each row of the transition matrix is a probability vector whose components necessarily sum to one. Formalization and a statement of how these values are calculated appears the Appendix. Ultimately, we are interested in whether repetition of the game results in some probabilities going to zero and others getting larger. If so, the prospects for empirical analysis are improved Analytically, the desired outcome is a fixed point , which is defined as a probability vector w such that
The vector w has an intuitive interpretation if this condition is met. It is a probability distribution over states such that starting with such probabilities, a single execution of the Markov process yields back those same probabilities. In other words, the condition indicates that the process has reached a steady state and will continue identically in perpetuity. Furthermore, it will reach such a state regardless of its starting values.
Testing for the existence of a fixed point can be done either analytically by solving a system of equations or computationally by simply multiplying the transition matrix by itself. If a fixed point w exists, all rows of the matrix P n will be identical, and the proximity of n to 1 indicates how rapidly the steady state is reached.
The transition matrix for the appointments game is summarized in figure 4.
States are arranged symmetrically so the transition probabilities should be symmetric as well. Clearly this is the case. Putting 1,296 cells of probabilities on a standard sheet of paper failed the ocular sensitivity test so I rounded and shaded the nonzero cells for presentation purposes. Skipping over type III momentarily, types IV and V have a status quo policy that is clearly out of equilibrium. Type IV states are invariably ones in which the status quo policy and agency composition are at odds with one another, and in which the policy moderate is pivotal within the agency. Clearly, this out of equilibrium state will be resolved by the choice of a moderate outcome, and, forever after, the states will be absorbed into the type I category.
Type V states are polar opposites of type IV states. Their common feature is that, again, the status quo is out of equilibrium. Their distinctive feature is that type V states are characterized by agencies with two identical preference outliers who have both a will and a way to change the policy to their liking, even when it is not to the proposer's liking. In the latter case, it is again an instance in which the proposer's inability to move the median cripples his strategic capacity.
The consequence here, in contrast to the type IV column, is absorption into the extremist steady state, type II.
Finally, type III states-of which there are only two-are exactly those highlighted above in the two-stage analysis in which first-stage gridlock occurs. When this happens, the destination of these non-absorbing states depends again on α and β. Preference profiles may change in such a way that the new state is of the absorbing type; they may also change, temporarily, to types IV or V, after which they are directly bound for type I or II.
In summary, these are all instances that capture the essence of the Markov analysis with an embedded Nash model. Nash behavior propels the Markov processes into substantively distinct clusters that are considerably more manageable than a 36x36 matrix.
Discussion
We explored strategic appointments from a new perspective that emphasizes their multistage, multi-actor, agenda-setting characteristics in a dynamic and uncertain environment. The analytical approach was, first, to develop and solve more-or-less conventional a multistage, multi-actor, agenda-setting model, second, to extend it and solve a repeated version of it, and, finally, to embed the repeated version in a Markov process that further characterizes players' uncertainty in a dynamic setting.
The approach was motivated in part by a belief that previous models of appoint- First, the present form of parameterizing the problem is in need of improvements. 13 After considering carefully what elements of strategic richness to add to a bare-bones model of the politics of appointments and coming up with parsimonious ways to represent them formally, it seems that few of them matter much. The Nature terms α and β are the exceptions and play a central role in extensions of the one period game. In contrast, the gridlock parameters, γ L and γ R , play almost no role other than to break occasional ties. 14 Similarly, the discount factors, δ L and δ R , affect the quantitative payoffs for players in the expected way, but do not 13 More generally, to set the tone for the discussion, if it isn't obvious yet that this is preliminary work in an area in which my substantive expertise is thin, then perhaps the proverbial reader ought to have been somewhat more attentive. I welcome ideas-particularly ones that are better than those expressed below (and, for that matter, above).
14 It is possible to force them to matter by making them implausibly large relative to the distance-based utility functions, but this is somewhat like making 15-yard penalties matter in the Michigan-OSU football game by increasing them it 150 yards. It doesn't make much sense in the context of the rest of the game.
have the kind of effects on strategic interaction as in, say, a Baron-Ferejohn dividethe-dollar game.
15 In other words, although these parts were intended to produce some interesting movement in the model, as it turns out, they are not central to the operation of the machine.
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Another significant limitation, at least from a relatively pure theory perspective, is the absence of a closed form solution for the games. I am relatively confident that this can be addressed, although, as I envision it, either the propositions will be extremely bulky with notation and cases, or, to keep them parsimonious, they will simply state the obvious: that there exist profiles of strategies, (a * 1 , a * 2 ) and (c * 1 , c * 2 ) that meet the usual best-response properties found in nearly any statement of equilibrium in noncooperative games. For the time being, I opted for an approach that cuts to the chase and characterizes specific behavior in specific situations for specific parameter settings rather than demanding generality upon the first pass.
17
The finding that was initially most disappointing is also the finding that, upon reflection, is most intriguing. The Markov analysis failed to produce a single fixed point like the tidy 2 × 2 or 3 × 3 examples in textbooks. Upon such a discovery, the inclination is to interpret such a finding either as an indication that the process one is studying is fundamentally unpredictable, or that the model as formulated evidently fails to capture the essence of the process. Although both of these are viable possibilities, they are not exhaustive. The finding of the Markov chain analysis is not one of complete unpredictability. It is better characterized as two distinct but stable regimes. There is a scenario in which this finding becomes 15 As cautioned earlier, I have not yet done much sensitivity analysis on this. 16 They are less like pistons and spark plugs and more akin to the hood ornament or large fins on a 1960 Pontiac gas guzzler.
17 A reason for my relative qualmlessness on this matter is that, even when the few gifted high-brow theorists manage to succeed with generality-first theory-building, mere-mortal consumers typically depend upon specific examples of general theories to gain a deep understanding of the interesting behavior within the theory. This practical observation is not intended as an excuse, however. The paper would (and I think will) be strengthened by generalization. helpful in understanding agency politics. It goes like this. The study of bureaucratic decision-making relies heavily on bureau-specific case studies. The diversity of findings in such studies raises several challenges. It is difficult to conduct comparative studies and almost impossible to make generalizations. Why? In part because of the absence of a common theoretical approach that accommodates the observed diversity. A framework such as the one developed in a preliminary way here, however, may prove useful for integrating case-based knowledge-or, likewise, generalizations from small-n studies-in a consistent manner. More specifically, it is not unthinkable that executive agencies or courts that make collective as opposed to individual choices are of two distinct types that parallel roughly the moderate and extremist absorbing states in table 2.
This reasoning relates to the literature on appointment politics in a straightforward way (or, to insiders, in a circuitous and radical way, perhaps). Large quantities of ink have been dispensed in an attempt to resolve the dichotomy known as presidential dominance versus congressional dominance, or, alternatively, congressional deference or congressional dominance. In the framework employed here, such dichotomies are transparently false. In political situations in which procedural rights are shared and not badly out of balance between parties with conflicting interests, no one "dominates" and no one "defers." Rather, politicians who have a stake in appointments exercise their procedural rights more or less optimally and win or lose in accordance with the strategic situation which, in the present model is encapsulated in the notion of a state. Fundamentally, the diversity of strategic situations is what creates the prospect for a diverse set of outcomes. Diverse outcomes, however, ought not to be construed as chaos, unpredictability, or inconsistency. On the contrary, diverse outcomes are invitations to develop theories that can account for their diversity. This theory has that potential.
Finally, the two-regime flavor of the steady states bears an unmistakable resemblance to several high-salience, parallel, and ongoing dialogues in comparative and its impact on the centrality or extremity of public policy? It is not immediately obvious how to map proposers and confirmers onto the central players in arenas of party competition, but it seems noteworthy that the two absorbing states in the Markov system look a lot like weak parties (type I) and a responsible two-party government (type II). The point is that further exploration of the utility of the chains and games approach ought not to be restricted to strategic appointments.
Elaboration on the Nature of Uncertainty in the Model
For any given state i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 36} at time t, rational play of the game results in a new set of conditions prior to Nature's move in period t.
Nature then acts on the agency A t and the proposer p t :
The range of α is at most a 3-tuple while the range of β is always a 2-tuple.
Because each possible outcome has a known probability, the expected state at period t + 1 can be summarized as a lottery over a subset of S:
wheres denotes that the state is a random variable, and p's are known probabilities, most of which are zero in any given stage. Players, therefore, do not know which state will be realized in stage two, but they know which states might be realized and they know the probability distribution over those states. Optimization in stage one, therefore, consists of maximizing expected utility. Players' payoffs over terminal nodes in the first stage can be thought of as the sum of their known payoff for such nodes at period t and of their expected payoffs in period t + 1 given by the specific lottery for the given node.
The above formalization is sufficient to solve the behavioral part of the model, but is insufficient for deriving the outcome states for the Markov analysis. Rather, the exercise needs to be repeated for the outcomes of play of the game during period t + 1. Since the state at the commencement of t + 1 is a random variable, and Nature introduces more randomness at the end of the second stage, ascertaining the probability distribution over states at the end of t + 1 requires a compound lottery.
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